According to various media reports, the Federal Council has summoned Martin Schlegel, president of the Swiss National Bank (SNB), for talks. At issue are the bank’s interventions in currency markets, which the United States has long viewed with suspicion.
A March 31st deadline set by Washington for concluding a trade agreement with Bern has come and gone without incident after a ruling by the Supreme Court of the United States, which struck down tariffs imposed since April 2025 by Donald Trump, altered the landscape. Even so, Guy Parmelin, Switzerland’s economy minister, has played down the prospect of a swift deal.
Yet the Swiss government is taking no chances. Mr Trump’s unpredictability has prompted Bern to engage directly with the SNB, whose efforts to curb the strength of the franc remain in Washington’s sights.
The United States has stepped up scrutiny of several trading partners. Following the court’s decision, Mr Trump responded with fresh measures, including a blanket 10% tariff on imports. His administration has also invoked Section 301, a provision that allows action against countries deemed to engage in unfair trade practices. Investigations have been launched into a number of economies, Switzerland among them.
At the heart of the dispute is Switzerland’s persistent trade surplus, a longstanding irritant in bilateral relations. American officials have also accused Switzerland of weakening its currency to boost exports—effectively, of manipulating the franc. The charge is not new. In 2020 Switzerland was briefly labelled a currency manipulator, alongside China, before the designation was dropped. Nonetheless, the SNB’s actions continue to attract scrutiny.
The central bank rejects the accusation. It argues that foreign-exchange purchases are a legitimate tool of monetary policy, aimed at maintaining price stability. A strong franc—one that has appreciated markedly against the dollar over recent decades—makes imports cheaper. While this benefits consumers, it also raises the risk of deflation: falling prices that may discourage spending and, in turn, weigh on economic activity.
Last September, Switzerland appeared to have reassured Washington. A joint statement with the U.S. Treasury committed both sides to avoiding the use of exchange rates for competitive advantage, while acknowledging Switzerland’s need to intervene in pursuit of domestic policy objectives.
Across the world, central banks rarely buy foreign currency to weaken their own. The Monetary Authority of Singapore is one of the few others that does so systematically.
In practice, the SNB has been restrained. Last year it purchased CHF 5.5bn in foreign currency, modest by historical standards. In 2015, after abandoning the franc’s cap against the euro, it bought the equivalent of CHF 86bn.
Over the past ten years, the Swiss franc has risen by 27% against the euro, the currency of Switzerland’s largest trading bloc. For exporters, the currency’s strength has been more painful than American tariffs.
Even so, Switzerland has once again been placed on a U.S. watch list this year. The SNB has shown little concern. Mr Schlegel has been clear: the risk of being labelled a manipulator will not deter the bank from acting, should economic conditions require it.
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